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Much recent attention has focused on the large values of actual and
projected federal deficits. To evaluate this discussion we must know
whether these deficits represent a shift in the structure of the govern-
ment's fiscal policy or are just the usual reaction to other influences,
such as recession, inflation, and government spending. A related, but
broader, question is whether the process that generates deficits in the
post-World War II period differs systematically from that in place ear-
lier-say, during the interwar period 1920-40. For example, has there
been a change in the average deficit or in the magnitude of the coun-
tercyclical response of deficits?
I begin by describing the tax-smoothing theory of deficits that I
developed earlier. Then I estimate this model on United States data
since 1920. Basically, the results are consistent with an unchanged
structure ofdeficits since that time. Specifically, the recent deficits and
the near-term projections ofdeficits reflect Inainly the usual responses
to recession and, it turns out, to anticipated inflation.
6.1 The Tax-Smoothing Model of Deficits
I analyze the determination of deficits within the framework of the
tax-smoothing model that I developed in an earlier paper (Barro 1979).1
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1. Some related work is Kydland and Prescott 1980 and Lucas and Stokey 1983. The
general idea of the implications of tax smoothing for the behavior of deficits appears
also in Pigou 1928, chap. 6.
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In this approach the government faces the exogenous, deterministic
stream ofreal expenditures other than interest payments, as given by
g(t). The base ofreal taxable income is the deterministic amount y(t),
which generally depends on the path of tax rates. I think of y(t) as a
fixed fraction ofthe economy's real GNP for period t. Let T(t) be the
average tax rate at date t, so that the amount ofreal income tax revenue
is T(t)y(t). Then, ifthe real interest rate is the constant r and the initial
real public debt is b(O), the government's budget constraint in terms
ofpresent values is2
(I)
In the presentformulation I do not separate the revenue from money
creation from the government's other revenues. Rather, I think ofin-
flationary finance as a tax on the holdings ofmoney. Then, in order to
focus on taxes in one period versus those in another, I combine the
inflation tax with the variety ofotherlevies (on income, sales, property,
etc.) that apply at the same date. In particular, there seems to be no
reason to give special treatment to the inflation tax.3
Suppose that the allocative effects from taxation depend on the "av-
erage marginal tax rate," Tm(t), for each period. That is, the time path
of average marginal tax rates, Tm(I), Tm(2), ... , influences people's
incentives to work, produce, and consume in the various periods. Here
I take a Ramsey-like optimal taxation perspective in orderto formulate
a testable positive theory ofthe government's choices oftax rates over
time.4 In particular, ifeach period is similar in terms of elasticities of
labor supply, and so on, then the Ramsey formulation dictates roughly
equal tax rates, Tm(t), for each period.5 More generally, this approach
would allow the tax rate to depend on time-varying features of the
economy such as war or peace and boom or recession. But to bring
out the main implications ofthe approach, I assume to begin with that
the government plans for equal average marginal tax rates, Tm(t), in
each period. Then I examine later some perturbations from this path
of uniform taxation.
2. This formulation assumes that the real interest rate exceeds the economy's steady-
state growth rate. For a discussion, see McCallum 1984.
3. Anticipated inflation amounts to a form of excise tax. But unanticipated inflation
entails a capital levy, which has different implications for the excess burden oftaxation
(see, for example, Barro 1983). However, changes in other kinds oftaxes can also imply
capital levies.
4. For discussions of Ramsey taxation, see Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, chap. 12, and
Ramsey 1927.
5. Kydland and Prescott 1980, 185-86, suggest that this rule will be close to optimal
if intertemporal substitution effects are strong.363 The Behavior of United States Deficits
I assume that the average marginal tax rate for any period bears a
stable relation to that period's average tax rate, T(t)-that is,
(2)
where the functionJis invariant overtime. In this case the stabilization
ofaverage marginal tax rates entails stabilization ofaverage tax rates.
If Tdenotes the constant value of the average tax rate, then the gov-
ernment's intertemporal budget constraint in equation (1) implies that
this tax rate is
(3)
Suppose that real government spending, get), and the real tax base,
yet), are fluctuating around trend values that grow at the common rate
n. That is, the time paths, g*(t) = g*(O)ent and y*(t) = y*(O)ent, have
the same present values as the respective actual time paths, get) and
y(t).6 Then the current "normal" values, g*(O) and y*(O), satisfy the
conditions
(4)
g*(Q) = (r - n)fg(t)e-rtdt,
y*(Q) = (r - n)fy(t)e -rtdt.
Dropping the time subscripts and substituting back into equation (3)
yields the formula for the (stabilized) average tax rate,
(5) T = [g* + (r - n)b]/y*.
Hence the tax rate equals the ratio of normal real spending to normal
real income, where normal real spending includes the real interest
payments on the outstanding public debt, rb, less the amount financed
by the usual growth ofthe real debt, nb. I discuss this last item further
below.
Thecurrentdeficit-whichI think ofas the changein the real quantity
ofinterest-bearing public debt, db/dt-is given at any date by
db/dt = g + rb - Ty = g + rb - y[g* + (r - n)b]/y*.
After rearranging terms, this expression becomes
(6) db/dt = (1 - y/y*)[g* + (r - n)b] + g - g* + nb.
The first term on the right side ofequation (6) indicates that the real
debt rises when output is below "normal"-that is, when y/y* < 1.
6. These assumptions rule out any drift in the ratio, gly. In the long run this drift
would be subject to the bounds, 0 < gly < 1.364 Robert J. Barro
Effectively, tax revenues fall in proportion to the fall in output (in order
for the average tax rate not to change). Hence, the amount ofrevenue
lost is the proportional shortfall ofoutput (1 - y/y*) multiplied by the
normal amount of real government spending (and revenues), g* +
(r - n)b. Note that, when tax rates are stabilized over time, the coef-
ficient of the cyclical variable, (1 - y/y*)[g* + (r - n)b], is unity in
equation (6). Alternatively, ifthe government were to set relatively low
tax rates during recessions, then it would have to engineer a more
dramatic countercyclicalresponse ofdeficits. Inthis casethecoefficient
of the cyclical variable would be greater than one. In any case, the
present analysis does not distinguish the automatic cyclical response
of tax revenues under a given tax law (which people sometimes try to
filter out in the construction ofa "full-employment deficit") from that
effected through "discretionary" fiscal policy. For example, under a
proportional income tax, average tax rates tend automatically to be
stabilizedoverthe business cycle, whereas undera graduatedrate setup
the average tax rate tends to be below normal during recessions and
above normal for booms. Thus a well-designed tax system may make
it unnecessary to change the tax laws frequently in order to achieve
the desired cyclical pattern of tax rates. If the analysis included ad-
justment costs for altering the tax laws, then it would be possible to
study the optimal design of these laws. But for the present analysis I
assume that some combination of automatic response within the tax
system plus discretionary changes in the laws achieves the desired
behavior ofdeficits.
.The second term on the right side ofequation (6), g - g*, indicates
that the real debt rises by the amount oftemporarily high real govern-
ment spending. Thereby the government avoids abnormally high tax
rates during periods when its expenditures are unusually high. Empir-
ically, my measure of temporary spending focuses on the unusually
high levels ofmilitary spending during wartime. Thus the unitary coef-
ficient on the (g - g*) variable in equation (6) reflects the government's
desire to equalize tax rates during wartime and peacetime periods.
Alternatively, ifthe tax rates were above normal during wars, then the
coefficient on the (g - g*) variable would be less than one.
Finally, other things equal, the last term in equation (6) says that the
real debt grows at the rate n, which is the trend growth rate of the
economy. Ifthe debt did not grow along withthe economy, then interest
payments would fall over time relative to GNP, which would be in-
consistent with stabilizing the average tax rate.
Note that the present formulation deals with the conventional con-
ceptofthe funded real public debt, b. Sometimes people suggest adding
the implicit debt that corresponds to the anticipated present value of
social social security benefits or of other government obligations. In36S The Behavior of United States Deficits
fact, the pertinent variable for the government's decisions on taxes is
g* (plus the amount, (r - n)b), which is the anticipated flow ofnormal
real spending. Aside from differences in the degree of uncertainty at-
tachedto various categoriesofexpenditures, itis clearthatfuture social
security benefits play no special role-rather, they enter the analysis
in a manner analogous to future defense spending, and so forth. How-
ever, the debt could be redefined ifdesired to include eitherthe present
value ofsocial security benefits or ofother expenditures. This change
in definition would not alter the central economic problem, which con-
cerns the government's choice oftax rates at different dates. But dif-
ferent concepts ofdeficits would behave in different manners.
Suppose, for example, that people expect a bulge in social security
benefits to occur five years from now and to last for ten years. On this
count, current spending g would be below the normal flow g*, which
calls for a surplus (db/dt < 0) in equation (6). Correspondingly, the
government raises taxes currently in order to prepare for the eventual
bulge in spending. However, ifthe debt included the present value of
social security benefits, then the rise overtime in this present value (as
the bulge in spendingapproaches) wouldoffsetthe surplus in thefunded
debt. Thatis, the broaderconceptofpublicdebt-whichincluded social
security-would not tend to decline over time. But no matter how one
defines the debt, the important point is that the prediction for tax rates
is identical. Namely, the expectation ofa bulge in future spending calls
for a rise in current tax rates. (Unfortunately, I have not yet isolated
this type of effect empirically for prospective government spending,
whether for social security or for other types ofspending.)
Dividing through in equation (6) by the level of real debt, b, the
results can be written in terms ofthe proportionate growth rate ofthe
real debt:
(7) (l/b)db/dt = (1 - y/y*)(g*/b + r - n) + (g - g*)/b + n.
Empirically, the term r - n is small relative to g*/b. (That is, normal
real spending g* is large relative to real interest payments, rb, less the
growth term, nb.) Hence I neglect the term r - n in the subsequent
analysis. Then it is appropriate to measure g* as the normal amount of
real government expenditures exclusive ofinterest payments.
When the time paths g(t) and y(t) are uncertain, the values g* and
y* are also uncertain. I interpret these magnitudes in equation (7) as
corresponding to anticipated present values ofreal government spend-
ing andGNP, assuminga known valueofthe real interestrate r. Possibly
some further results could be obtained by modeling explicitly the un-
certainty for future government spending and private endowments.7
7_See Lucas and Stokey 1983 for a treatment of uncertainty_366 Robert J. Barro
The main point is that new information about the long-run values of
spending, g*, and income, y*, lead to corresponding changes in the
average tax rate, 1", as shown in equation (5). Thus the tax rate adjusts
for surprise changes in spending and income, but the sign ormagnitude
ofthe necessary adjustments cannot be predicted in advance. In other
words, the tax rate follows a martingale. However, some predictable
changes in tax rates m(}.y appearif-as mentioned before-the tax rate
depends on the state of the economy. For example, if tax rates were
lower than normal during recessions, then pre~ictable increases in tax
rates would occur along with the (predictable) ends ofrecessions. Sim-
ilarly, iftax rates were higherthan normal during wars, then predictable
declines in tax rates would show up at the (predictable) ends ofwars.
Thus, the martingale propertyfor taxrates is notcentralto the approach
followed in this paper.8
Another property of the theory is that it prescribes no target value
for the level ofpublic debt orfor the ratio ofdebt to income. A higher
initial value of debt is "undesirable" in the sense that it requires a
higher tax rate at each date (equation 5), which then entails a larger
excess burden from taxation. But (with default ruled out) it is not
worthwhile for the government systematically to run surpluses in order
to payoffthe debt.9 Such a policy implies temporarily high tax rates,
which violates the tax-smoothing criterion. Thus, given the right-side
variables in equation (7), there is no independent effect on the growth
rate of debt from the starting value of the debt/income ratio. (This
conclusion would still follow even ifthe government varied the tax rate
with the business cycle or with conditions ofwar and peace.)
The argument above is consistent with the marked tendency of the
ratio of public debt to GNP to fall during peacetime, nonrecession
years. (See Barro 1984, chap. 15, for the long-term evidence on this
behaviorfrom the United States and the United Kingdom.) The variable
g* incorporates a country's propensity to experience infrequent but
possibly large wars. Therefore temporary spending, g - g*, is negative
rather than zero during the typical peacetime year. Hence the debt/
income ratio tends to fall during peacetime and to rise sharply during
the infrequen.t large wars.
If the price level follows a known path, then equation (7) describes
the time path of the real debt. Hence, the nominal debt-denoted by
8. In a previous study (Barro 1981a) I accepted the random walk hypothesisfor average
tax rates, although the statistical tests were not very powerful. Subsequently I have
rejected the random walk hypothesis for some revised systems. Sahasakul 1983 finds
evidence that average marginal tax rates are lower than normal during recessions and
higher than normal during wars.
9. Ifan increase in the debt/income ratio raises the required real interest rate payable
onpublic debt (perhaps becauseofan increasing probabilityofthegovernment's default),
then there would be a force that deters the government from amassing very high debt/
income ratios.367 The Behavior of Uoited States Deficits
B-grows at the rate ofinflation, 1T, plus the amount shown on the right
side ofequation (7). That is (neglecting the term, r - n, in equation 7),
(8) (lIB)dBldt = n + 1T + (1 - yly*)(g*lb ) + (g - g*)lb.
Note that the inflation rate, 1T, has a one-to-one effect on the growth
rate ofthe nominal debt.
A one-time surprisejump in the price level would shift the real debt,
b, by a discrete amount in the opposite direction. Then, except for the
shift in b on the right side ofequation (8), there would be no alteration
to the subsequent path ofgrowth rates ofthe debt-in particular, there
is no tendency to adjust the nominal debt in order to compensate for
the unexpected inflation (and thereby to restore some target value of
the real debt). It follows in equation (8) that the variable 1T should be
replaced by the expected rate of inflation, '1Te • (In the presence of in-
dexed public debt, the actual rate of inflation would be appropriate.)
The main point is that the planned growth rate of the real debt, (liB)
(dB/dt) - 1Te , depends on the real variables (other than 1T) that appear
on the right side ofequation (8). Hence, the government's deficit policy
is specified in real terms, rather than being subject to some form of
money illusion.
Given the expected real interest rate r, a higher value ofanticipated
inflation shows up as a higher nominal interest rate. Hence the previous
result says that the government finances the (expected) inflation part
of its nominal interest payments by issuing new nominal debt rather
than by levying taxes. Although this interpretation is suggestive, it
turns out that the results do not depend on a one-to-one relation be-
tween expected inflation and nominal interest rates. Any discrepancy
here appears as a different value for the expected real interest rate.
But a different level for the real interest rate does not affect the growth
rate of the debt in equation (8) (assuming a given real growth rate, n,
and neglecting the effect from the r - n term in equation 7). A per-
manently higher real interest rate induces a once-and-for-all adjustment
ofthe tax rate (equation 5), but no response ofthe deficit. On the other
hand, if the expected real interest were temporarily high or low, then
the deficit would adjust accordingly. Thus far I have not investigated
this possibility empirically.
When the debt is long term there are also changes in the real market
value from changes in long-term nominal interest rates. A one-time
jump in the nominal interest rate shifts the current market value ofthe
debt by a discrete amount in the opposite direction. For example,
Butkiewicz (1983) shows that the market value ofthe debt (Bm) can be
well approximated empirically from the par value (BP) by using the
formula
(9) Bm ~ BP(1 + hc)/(l + hR),368 Robert J. Barro
where e is the average coupon rate on the outstanding bonds, R is the
overall market yield, and h is the average maturity of the bonds. For
given values of c and h, the effect ofa change in market yield on the
market value ofdebt is approximately
(10) dBm/Bm = -dR· h/(I + hR).
Equations (7) and (8) describe the paths of the market value of the
real and nominal debt, respectively, subsequent to the initial discrete
shift in market value at the moment of the one-time shift in yield. In
particular, this discrete shift affects subsequentgrowth rates ofthe debt
only through the change in b on the right side ofthe equations (and by
any change in expected inflation that accompanies the shift in the long-
term nominal interestrate). As with a surprise change in the price level,
there is no tendency to return to a normal real market value of the
debt. But in orderto explain the overall movements in the market value
of the debt, it is necessary to include an additional variable-such as
that shown in equation (IO)-in order to measure the effect ofsurprise
changes in interest rates. In practice, I assume that all changes in the
yield on government bonds, R, are unanticipated.
When considering the public debt, most researchers deal with the
par value rather than the market value. (However, some reliable es-
timates of market value are now available for the post-World War II
period, as discussed below.) A surprise jump in nominal interest rates
has no immediate effect on the debt when measured at par value. But
as the old debt matures the government effectively replaces it with new
debt, which bears, say, a higher coupon. (I assume that all debt is
issued at par.) Thus, if nothing else changes the government would
face a rising path of real interest payments-that is, current real pay-
ments would be low relative to the average of anticipated future real
payments. As with any path of rising real expenditures, the govern-
ment's policy oftax smoothing requires a rise in the current tax rate,
which means a smaller current deficit. In other words, a surprise in-
crease in nominal interest rates leads to a gradual reduction over time
in the real debt when measured at par value. In fact, if there are no
further surprises in interest rates (and the debt has finite maturity),
then the real par value gradually approaches the real market value,
which fell in a discrete fashion at the moment of the one-time shift in
interest rates.
Using equation (9), the effect on the par value of the debt from a
change in the average coupon rate is
(II) dBp/Bp = -de· h/(I + he).
Suppose that the retirement of old debt means that the coupon rate,
e, approaches the market yield, R, gradually, with the speed of ad-
justment depending inversely on the average maturity, h-that is,369 The Behavior of United States Deficits
de/dt :::= (I/h)(R - c).
Then, using equation (11), the effect on the par value of the debt is
(12) (I/BP)dBP/dt :::= - (R - e)/(I + he).
1add the right-side variable (unsuccessfully) to some ofthe equations
that 1estimate below. (I have data on R, e, and h only for the period
since 1946.)
6.2 Setup ofthe Empirical Analysis
The equation that 1 estimate with annual United States data over
subsamples of the period 1920-82 takes the form
(13) 10g(B/Bt _ 1) = ao + at'rr~ + a2YVARt
+ a3GVARt + a4RVARt + UH
where Ut is an error term with the usual properties and the other vari-
ables are as follows:
B: end-of-calendar year (par or market) value ofthe United States
government's interest-bearing public debt, exclusive ofholdings
at federal agencies and trust funds or the Federal Reserve. Mar-
ket value figures are based on Seater (1981) and Butkiewicz
(1983).
11"~: expected rate of inflation (for the CPI),10 generated as a fore-
casting relation based on the following: two annual lags of in-
flation, 11"t- I and 11"t-2;twoannuallags ofmonetarygrowth(based
on annual averages of MI), JoLt-1 and JoLt-I; and the interest rate
on four- to six-month commercial paper at the end of the pre-
vious year, RCt_l.ll That is, the equation for inflation is
(14) 11"t = bo + bl11"t-1 + b211"t-2 + b3 JoLt-1
+ b4JoLt-2 + bsRCt- 1 + error term.
10. These inflation rates are January-to-January values, using the consumerprice index
less shelter since 1947. For 1943-47, the data are strongly affected by price controls.
Instead ofusing the reported price levels, I substituted values based on the extrapolation
of an estimated price-level equation from some previous research (Barro 1981c, 157).
This adjustment shifts the inflation rates as follows: from 2.9% to 25.8% for 1943, from
2.3% to 13.0% for 1944, from 2.2% to 3.2% for 1945, from 16.7% to -4.8% for 1946,
and from 10.2% to - 2.9% for 1947. This procedure affects the subsequent results mainly
for the samples that include the World War II years. (There are also some effects of
lagged inflation rates on the estimates for 1948-49.)
11. Theoretically, the annual average of 'lt1 would matter, which means that some
updating of expectations for current-period information comes into play. The present
procedure excludes current-period information (and thereby avoids some econometric
problems). I used the commercial paper rate, rather than, say, a one-year treasury bill
rate, in order to have a consistent variable for the full sample. The difference between
a four- to six-month maturity and a one-year maturity would not be ofmajor significance
for the results.370 Robert J. Barro
This equation for inflation is estimated jointly with the debt
equation (13).
The behavior of inflation in the post-World War II period differs
markedly from that before the war. First, there is positive persistence
in inflation rates from year to year, which is not true earlier; second,
lagged monetary growth is a positive predictor ofinflation, which also
does not apply earlier; and third, the variance of the inflation rate-
conditioned on information from the previous year-is much smaller
now than before. Some experimentation indicated that the main break
in the structure of the inflation equation occurred around the Korean
War-possibly with the accords between the Fed and the Treasury,
which relieved the Fed from strict stabilization ofinterest rates. In any
event, I estimate separate coefficients ofthe inflation equation (14) for
the period up to 1953 and for the recent period, 1954-82. (It turns out
that, in order to maximize the overall value ofthe likelihood function,
it would be slightly preferable to break the sample at 1955/56. But I
have retained the break at 1953/54, which has some rationale a priori.)
Note thatin equation (13) the hypothesized coefficientofthe 'lTe variable
is at = 1.
Returning to the specification of variables in equation (13),
YVARt == (1 - y/y;) . (g;/5t),
GVARt == (gt - g;)/5o
where 5 t is a geometric average of the year-end values, Bt and Bt - b
divided by the GNP deflator for year t. 12
I base the measure of temporary real federal spending, gt - g;, on
the variable I used previously (Barro 1981b) to explain fluctuations in
real GNP. In that approach I isolated mainly the temporary parts of
military spending that accompanied wars. Shifts in the ratio offederal
nondefense expenditures to GNP and shifts during peacetime in the
ratio of military spending to GNP were treated as predominantly per-
manent (in the sense that the ratios followed random walks). Sahasakul
(1983) finds additional components of temporary real federal spending
from the following: (1) a drift since the 1930s in the ratio of federal
transfers to GNP; (2) the tendency since the 1930s ofreal federal trans-
fers to move countercyclically; and (3) the tendency ofwars to crowd
out the nonmilitary components of federal spending. However, these
influences do not introduce variables that are independent ofthose that
12. The forms of the YVAR and GVAR variables in equation (13) arise as an approx-
imation for discrete-time data to the continuous-time formulation in equation (8). The
approximation seems to be satisfactory except for the very large values of (gt - g;)lbt
that arise at the start of World War I.371 The Behavior of United States Deficits
I include anyway in the equation to explain the growth rate of debt.
Mainly, there are implications for the interpretations of coefficients-
for example, the variable GVAR will measure the impact oftemporary
wartime spending net of the typical transitory decline in the other
components of real federal spending during wartime. Recall that the
tax-smoothing model predicts that the coefficient ofGVARt in equation
(13) is Q3 = 1. But the crowding out of other federal spending during
wars implies Q3 < 1. In addition, iftax rates are somewhatabove normal
during wartime, then the coefficient Q3 would be reduced further below
one.
For the cyclical variable YVAR in equation (13), I need a measure
ofthe temporary shortfall ofoutput, (1 - y/y;). In my previous study
(Barro 1979), I used the deviation ofcurrentreal GNP, which measured
Yn from trend real GNP, which measured y; .13 I again report results
with this construct, although it deals incorrectly with permanent shifts
to the level ofoutput. In these cases the variable indicates a permanent
departure of output from normal. The results improve if I use instead
the unemployment rate, Un to proxyfor the shortfall in output, (1 - y,l
y;). As long as the unemployment rate is stationary in levels, this
variable will work satisfactorily even when there are permanent shifts
to the level ofoutput.
My main results use the total unemployment rate (including the mil-
itary in the labor force).I4 Then I assume: a stable relation between
percentage shortfalls in output and the departure ofthe unemployment
rate from a fixed natural rate:
(15) (1 - y,ly;) = 'A(Ut - .054).
I take the natural unemployment rate in this formulation to be 5.4%,
which is the median rate over the sample 1890-1982. (The value 5.4%
is also close to the median and mean over the period 1948-82.) For
the post-World War II period (for which data are available), I obtain
similar results ifI use instead the prime-age male unemployment rate,
U'!'. Some people argue that this variable is more stable over long
periods than the overall unemployment rate. Note that in equation (15)
the parameter 'A is an Okun's law type ofcoefficient, which is likely to
lie between two and three.
As a general statement it would be preferable to construct normal
output, y;, as an explicit time series representation for "permanent
income." (My measure for gt - g; does take this approach, although
13. For trend real GNP, the growth rate was 3.4% per year since 1946 and before 1914.
From 1915 to 1945, the two trend lines were connected, implying an average growth rate
of 2.5% per year.
14. I also adjust the values from 1933 to 1943 as suggested by Darby 1976 to include
New Deal workers as employed.372 Robert J. Barro
only for military spending.) But I have thus far been unsuccessful along
these lines in the construction of the variable Y;.
The variable YVARt depends also on normal real federal spending,
g;. I use here Sahasakul's (1983) concept ofnormal real federal spend-
ing, which combines normal military spending (which entered above
into the construction of the GVAR variable) with measures of normal
real federal spending for transfers and nondefense purchases. In this
context the results are relatively insensitive to the precise measure of
g;, as long as the variable picks up the longer-term movements in the
size of the federal government. But when making comparisons over
long periods, it is important to recall that the growth rate of the debt
in equation (13) depends on the YVAR variable, which equals the per-
centage shortfall in output, (1 - Y/Y;), multiplied by the ratio g;lbt • For
example, in 1982 this last variable is 0.83, while in 1933 it is 0.17.
Hence-because of the high value of normal real federal spending in
recent years-a one-percentage-point shortfall in output has five times
as much effect on the growth rate of debt as it would have in 1933
(where the percentage shortfall in output was much larger)}5
The tax-smoothing model suggests that the coefficient of YVARt in
equation (13) would be a2 = 1. However, the countercyclical behavior
oftransfers and any tendency to lower tax rates during recessions lead
to a2 > 1. When the unemployment rate proxies for the shortfall in
output (equation 15), the estimated coefficient on YVARt is also mul-
tiplied by the Okun's law coefficient, A.
The variable RVARt in equation (13) accounts for the effects ofchanges
in interest rates. With the debt measured at par value, the interest rate
variable (available since 1946) is RVARt = (fir - ct)/(1 + lit ct), where
R is the yield, h is average maturity, c is the average coupon rate, and
overbars signify averages over the year. When the debt is measured at
market value (available accurately since 1941), the interestrate variable
is RVARt = lit(Rt - Rt- 1)/(1 + litfir). In both cases the hypothesized
coefficient in equation (13) is a4 = -1.
6.3 Empirical Results
Table 6.1 shows joint, maximum-likelihood estimates for the debt
equation (13) and the inflation equation (14). For the debt equations in
this table, theRVAR variable is omitted and the YVAR variable is based
on the overall unemployment rate. The first six sets ofresults refer to
the sample 1920-40, 1948-82, which excludes the years associated
15. The ratio of the real deficit to real GNP, (db/dt)/Yt, depends on g;IYt. This last
variable is .21 in 1982 and .06 in 1933.373 The Behavior of United States Deficits
with World War II. The inflation equations report separate coefficients
for the two subperiods 1920-40,48-53 and 1954-82. Also, the obser-
vations in the inflation equation for the first subperiod, 1920-40/48-
53, are weighted by .40 in order to correct for heteroskedasticity (that
is, for a higher error variance in the earlier sample).
For set 1in table 6.1, the coefficients ofthe inflation equation in the
earlier subperiod are insignificant except for negative effects of the
lagged interest rate (coefficient of -1.2; SE = 0.2) and ofthe second
lag of monetary growth (- 0.29; SE = 0.09). The first effect probably
reflects the tendency for (real) interest rates to be high during financial
crises, which were also times ofdeflation. The second effect picks up
the tendency for reversals in monetary growth under the earlier mon-
etary regime. By contrast, for the later subperiod 1954-82, the coef-
ficients of the first lags of inflation and monetary growth are each
strongly positive (0.81; SE = 0.18 and 0.67; SE = 0.15, respectively).
Surprisingly, the coefficient ofthe nominal interest rate is still negative
(- 0.37; SE = 0.14). The results for the inflation equation remain ba-
sically similar in the specifications discussed later.
Expected inflation, 'TTT, is calculated from the coefficients in the in-
flation equation. In set 1 of table 6.1, the coefficient of 'TTT in the debt
equation is constrained to equal one, while in set 2 this coefficient is
left free. Note that the unconstrained estimate for this coefficient is
0.97; SE = 0.12, which is consistent with the theoretical value ofunity.
Therefore I focus on the constrained results, which appear in set 1.
The estimated coefficient ofGVAR (0.27; SE = 0.09) is significantly
positive, but well below the value ofunity that is suggested by the tax-
smoothing model. The results in Sahasakul (1983) indicate that a small
part ofthis discrepancy reflects the crowding out ofother components
of federal spending during wartime. But the main element is the ten-
dency for average tax rates to be above normal during wars. I discuss
theseresultsfurtherwhentheobservationsforWorld WarIIareincluded.
The estimated coefficient of YVAR (3.88; SE = 0.26) is positive and
highly significant, which shows the strong countercyclical behavior of
deficits. Dividing by an Okun's law coefficient of2.5 (see equation 15)
suggests that the reactionofdebtgrowthto shortfalls in outputinvolves
a coefficient of about 1.5. The excess of this coefficient above one
reflects the tendencyduringrecessionsfor average tax rates to bebelow
normal andfor real federal transfers to be above normal (see Sahasakul
1983 for a detailed breakdown between these two elements). To see
the quantitative effect of unemployment on the deficit, recall that the
pertinent variable is YVARt = (VI - .054) . (g;lbt), which has an es-
timated coefficient of3.9. In 1982 the variable g;lbt equals 0.83, which
means that a one-percentage point increase in the unemployment rate374 Robert J. Barro






















































































































































Note: For the debt equation, the dependent variable, DB" is the growth rate from end
DecembertoendDecemberoftheprivatelyheld, interest-bearingpublicdebt. Thefigures
are parvalue exceptfor sets 13-14in table6.2, which usemarketvalues. Forthe inflation
equation, the dependent variable, 1T" is the growth rate (January to January) of the
consumer price index (measured without the shelter component since 1947).
The inflation equation (in sets 1-8 and sets 19-24 in table 6.3) allows for separate
coefficients for the subperiod up to 1953 and for the later subperiod 1954-82. The earlier
observations are weighted by .40 (the maximumlikelihood estimatefrom set 1) to correct
for heteroskedasticity. In sets 7-8, which include World War II, the observations for
1943-47 are deleted from the inflation equation.
For the debt equation, there are separate coefficients over two subperiods in the cases
indicated (sets 3-6 and 21-24). Otherwise a single set ofcoefficients applies for the full
sample. In any event, the variance of the error term is assumed to be constant for the
full sample.
5£ is the log of the value of the likelihood function. The independent variable 1Te is
calculated as a forecast of 1Tt from the coefficients of the inflation equation. The value375 The Behavior of Uoited States Deficits
'liable 6.1 (continued)
Equation for 11't (I. Sample up to 1953 II. Sample 1954-82)
Constant 11't-l 11't-2 ....t-l ....t-2 RCt- 1 uIDW
0.33 .06 .14 .04 -.29 -1.16 .015
(.010) (.12) (.11) (.10) (.09) (.23) 1.6
.002 .81 -.02 .67 .05 -.37
(.006) (.18) (.12) (.15) (.20) (.14)
.033 .06 .14 .04 -.29 -1.18 .015
(.010) (.12) (.11) (.10) (.09) (.25) 1.6
.002 .82 -.03 .68 .05 -.37
(.006) (.18) (.12) (.16) (.20) (.14)
.037 .01 .17 .05 - .31 -1.26 .015
(.010) (.12) (.11) (.11) (.09) (.24) 1.5
.004 .81 -.06 .71 .05 -.40
(.006) (.18) (.13) (.16) (.20) (.14)
.025 -.01 .16 .01 -.24 -.94 .015
(.012) (.10) (.09) (.08) (.09) (.30) 1.6
.000 .89 - .15 .81 .03 -.40
(.006) (.19) (.14) (.17) (.21) (.15)
.037 .01 .17 .05 -.32 -1.25 .015
(.01l) (.12) (.11) (.10) (.09) (.23) 1.5
.004 .81 -.07 .71 .05 -.41
(.006) (.18) (.13) (.16) (.20) (.14)
.030 -.01 .16 .04 -.27 -1.04 .014
(.013) (.10) (.10) (.08) (.10) (.31) 1.7
-.002 .91 -.20 .84 .02 -.37
(.007) (.20) (.14) (.18) (.22) (.15)
.005 .13 -.41 .19 -.04 -.55 .015
(.014) (.16) (.14) (.15) (.13) (.32) 2.0
-.004 .91 -.34 .85 -.06 -.21
(.007) (.21) (.14) (.18) (.24) (.16)
.005 .13 -.41 .19 -.04 -.55 .015
(.014) (.16) (.15) (.15) (.13) (.33) 2.0
-.004 .91 -.35 .85 -.06 -.20
(.007) (.21) (.14) (.18) (.24) (.16)
1indicates thatthe coefficientofthis variableis constrainedtounity. The variableGVAR,
based on temporary military spending, is discussed in the text.
The cyclical variable YVAR, described in the text, is based on the overall unemploy-
ment rate, Vt - .054, for sets 1-10 and 13-18. Sets 11 and 12 use the prime-age male
unemployment rate, Vrn - .041. Sets 19-24 use real GNP relative to trend.
In sets 13-14 of table 6.2 (which use the market value of debt), the variable RVARt
= ht(Rt-Rt-1) / (1 + htRt), where R is the average yield on government debt and h is
the average maturity. Overbars ~dicate estima..tes of averages over the year. For sets
15-16 the variable is RVARt = (ft, - ct) / (1 + htct), where c is the average coupon rate
on government debt. Sets 17-18 use the lagged value of this last measure ofRVAR.
uis the standarderrorofestimate; OW (shownbelow0) is the Durbin-Watson statistic.
In the inflation equation, 11't-l and 11't-2 are lagged values of the dependent variable,
J.Lt-l and J.Lt-2 are lagged values of monetary growth (based on annual averages of Ml),
and RCt- 1 is the value from the previous December of the four-to six-month rate on
commercial paper.376 Robert J. Barro
raises the estimated growth ofthe debt by 3.9 . (0.83) = 3.2 percentage
points per year. For a debt level of $850 billion (December 1982), the
corresponding increase in the deficit is by 3.2% . 850 = $27 billion.
The standard error of estimate for the debt equation is 0- = 0.023
(that is, ± 2.3 percentage points per year). This result corresponds to
an R2 of .91, although the maximization of R2 is not the criterion for
the estimation. The Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.2 suggests that serial
correlation of residuals is not a problem.
The results in sets 3-6 oftable 6.1 check whether the debt equation
is stable over various subperiods. Sets 3 and 4 allow the coefficients
for 1920-40 to differ from those for 1948-82. Sets 5 and 6 specify the
first subperiod as 1920-40, 48-53 and the second as 1954-82. Also,
sets 3 and 5 constrain the coefficient ofthe 7Te variable to unity, while
sets 4 and 6 relax this constraint. In all cases the hypothesis of stable
coefficients over the two subperiods is accepted at conventional sig-
nificance levels by likelihood-ratio tests. Forexample, for set 3 (where
the samples are 1920-40 and 1948-82, and where the coefficient of 7Te
is fixed at one), the value of - 2 . log (likelihood ratio) is 3.2, which is
below the 5% critical value for the X2 distribution with three degrees
offreedom of7.8. Forset 4 (where the 7Te coefficients are unrestricted),
the test statistic is 8.2, with a 5% critical value with four degrees of
freedom of9.5. The results are basically similar in sets 5 and 6, where
the break in the sample is at 1953-54.
These findings are important, since they indicate that the process for
generating deficits in the interwar period, 1920-40 (or the period 1920-
40, 1948-53) is broadly similar to that in the post-World War II period,
1948-82 (or 1954-82). In particular, the statistical evidence does not
support the idea that there has been a shift toward a fiscal policy that
generates more real public debt on average or that generates larger
deficits in response to recessions. (In set 3 of table 6.1, the estimated
coefficients of the YVAR variable are 3.48; SE = 0.45 for 1920-40;
and 4.54, SE = 0.45 for 1948-82. However, even this pattern ofhigher
point estimates in the later period reverses later when I consider an
alternative measure of the YVAR variable.)
Sets 7 and 8 of table 6.1 deal with the full sample, 1920-82, which
adds the years associated with World War II, 1941-47, to the previous
sample. 16 Aside from the deterioration in fit-as measured by the stan-
dard error of estimate, o--the most striking change is the increase in
the coefficient of the GVAR variable. Naturally this variable is the
principal source of deficits during World War II. The estimated coef-
16. Because of the problems with price controls (note 10 above), I exclude the
years 1943-47 from the inflation equation. The values of 1Tf for these years are those
implied by the estimated coefficients for the earlier subperiod, 1920-40, 1948-53.377 The Behavior of Uoited States Deficits
ficient is now 0.76; SE = 0.05, which is highly significant and closer
to the hypothesized value ofunity. But it is also clear that the present
formulation does not satisfactorily include the observationsfrom World
War II into the specificationthatworks satisfactorilyfor theotheryears.
One ofthe problems is that the estimated inflation equation (using the
coefficients from the earlier subperiod, 1920-40, 1948-53-see note
16 above) generates implausibly low values ofanticipated inflation dur-
ing World War II. Specifically, these values are close to zero throughout
the period 1941-45. The specification has to be changed to allow the
earlier monetary regime to generate high values of monetary growth
and inflation during wartime. (Similar problems arise when I attempt
to add the observations from World War I, 1917-19.) It is also clear
that the measure oftemporary wartime spending, GVAR, is subject to
substantial measurement error during the major wars, which accounts
for some ofthe increase in the standard errorofestimate. This problem
can probably be handled by estimating the GVAR variable (as I did in
Barro 1981b) jointly with the debt and inflation equations.
Table 6.2 shows some additional results for the recent sample, 1954-
82. Sets 9 and 10 (with the 7I'e coefficient restricted to one and unre-
stricted, respectively) are similar to those for the longer sample (with
World War II excluded), as shown in sets 1 and 2 oftable 6.1. Sets 11
and 12 oftable 6.2 change the YVAR variable to use the prime-age male
unemployment rate, U'f - .041, where 0.041 is the mean value of Urn
over the period 1954-82. Although the fit of the equation for debt
growth in sets 11 and 12 is slightly worse than that in sets 9 and 10,
the general nature of the results is similar.
Sets 13 and 14 of table 6.2 use the estimated market value of the
public debt, rather than the par value, in the construction of the de-
pendent variable. The equation for debt growth now includes an in-
terest rate variable, RVARt , which picks up the effect on the market
value of debt from changes in interest rates. For set 13 (where the
coefficient of 7I'e is fixed at one), the estimated coefficient ofRVARt is
- 0.83; SE = 0.13, which differs insignificantly from the hypothe-
sized value of - 1. The other results are broadly similar to those found
in sets 9 and 10, which are based on the par value of public debt.
In sets 15-18 of table 6.2 I attempt to find an effect from changes
in interest rates on the growth in debt when measured at par value.
(The variable RVARt is now based on the difference between the yield
and the coupon rate-see the notes to table 6.2.) Although the hy-
pothesized coefficient ofRVARt is -1, the estimated values in sets 15
and 16 are positive, butwith very high standarderrors. Since theRVARt
variable may be proxying for within-period revisions of expected in-
flation, I used instead the lagged value, RVARt _ b in sets 17 and 18.
The estimated coefficients do decrease-for example, to -0.13; SE =378 Robert J. Barro
Table 6.2 Regression Results for 1954-82 Sample
Equation for DBt
Set Sample :£ Constant 1re GVAR YVAR RVAR 6/DW
(9) 156.0 .011 .31 4.21 .019
(.007) (.12) (.42) 2.2
(10) 156.8 .024 .71 .35 4.67 .019
(.009) (.16) (.12) (.41) 2.0
(11) YVAR 152.5 .004 1 .19 3.73 .022
uses Um (.008) (.13) (.44) 1.8
(12) YVAR 152.8 -.003 1.18 .20 3.57 .022
uses Um (.012) (.23) (.12) (.46) 2.0
(13) DB from 151.6 .022 1 .39 4.72 -.83 .023
market value (.008) (.15) (.49) (.13) 2.3
(14) DB from 153.2 .038 .66 .46 5.31 - .81 .023
market value (.009) (.16) (.14) (.47) (.13) 2.1
Add RVARt 156.3 .007 1 .30 4.18 .45 .019
(15) to (9) (.009) (.11) (.42) (.59) 2.2
(16)
Add RVARt 157.2 .020 .68 .32 4.63 .57 .019
to (10) (.010) (.17) (.12) (.14) (.62) 2.1
(17) Add RVARt - 1 156.0 .012 1 .32 4.23 -.13 .019
to (9) (.009) (.12) (.44) (.60) 2.2
(18) Add RVARt - 1 156.9 .024 .70 .35 4.68 .11 .019
to (10) (.010) (.16) (.12) (.42) (.65) 2.1
Note: See notes to table 6.1.
0.60, in set 17. These results are consistent with the theoretical value
of - 1, although the estimates are very imprecise.
Table 6.3, which refers to the sample 1920-40, 1948-82, uses output
relative to trend rather than the unemployment rate in the construction
ofthe cyclical variable, YVAR. The fits for the debt equation are sub-
stantially worse than those achieved with the unemployment rate-
compare, for example, sets 19 and 20 in table 6.3 with sets 1 and 2 in
table 6.1. It turns out that the main differences arise in the post-World
War II sample, especially during the 1974-76 recession. In any event
the results based on output relative to trend are still consistent with
an unchanged structureofthe debt equation overeitherthe subperiods,
1920-40 and 1948-82 (sets 21 and 22 of table 6.3) or 1920-40/48-53
and 1954-82 (sets 23 and 24).
One advantage of the results in table 6.3 is that the estimated coef-
ficient ofthe YVAR variable reveals directly the effect on debt growth
from shortfalls in output. For example, in set 19, the estimated coef-
ficient is 1.35; SE = 0.13. This estimate is significantly above the value
ofunity that comes from the tax-smoothing model, though some ofthis379 The Behavior of United States Deficits
Table 6.2 (continued)
Equation for 'Tl't
Constant 'Tl't-l 'Tl't-2 J-Lt-l J-Lt-2 RCt - 1 fTlDW
.005 .77 .05 .63 .08 -.44 .015
(.005) (.14) (.11) (.13) (.15) (.11) 1.5
.000 .88 -.08 .79 .06 -.45 .014
(.006) (.17) (.12) (.16) (.18) (.13) 1.7
.000 .84 .08 .72 .12 -.52 .016
(.005) (.14) (.11) (.13) (.16) (.11) 1.6
.003 .78 .13 .64 .12 -.50 .016
(.006) (.15) (.10) (.14) (.15) (.12) 1.5
.001 .77 - .10 .70 .02 -.29 .014
(.006) (.17) (.12) (.15) (.19) (.13) 1.7
-.003 .88 -.25 .84 -.02 -.27 .013
(.006) (.19) (.13) (.17) (.21) (.14) 2.0
.006 .78 .06 .62 .09 -.47 .016
(.005) (.14) (.10) (.12) (.15) (.11) 1.5
.001 .90 -.07 .78 .07 -.49 .014
(.006) (.17) (.12) (.16) (.18) (.14) 1.7
.004 .77 .05 .64 .08 -.44 .015
(.005) (.14) (.11) (.13) (.15) (.11) 1.6
.000 .88 -.09 .79 .06 -.45 .014
(.006) (.17) (.12) (.16) (.18) (.13) 1.8
excess reflects the countercyclical behavior offederal transfers. (Sets
21-24 show that the point estimates ofthe YVAR coefficients from the
earlier subperiods exceed those from the later subperiods, which re-
verses the patternfound before with the unemployment rate. However,
these differences across subperiods are statistically insignificant.)
6.4 Some Episodes of United States Debt Issue
Table 6.4 shows actual and estimated values for the growth rate of
nominal debt, DBt , and the inflation rate, 11't , over the sample 1920-
40, 1948-82. The estimated values come from the regressions shown
in set 1oftable 6.1 (where the coefficient of 11'e is constrained to unity).
Table 6.5 shows the values of the explanatory variables GVAR and
YVAR (based on the overall unemployment rate), as well as the ratio
g*/6, which enters into the construction of the YVAR variable.
Note first the negative values of DB and DB (i.e., "surpluses")
throughout the 1920s. These derive, first, from negative values of an-
ticipated inflation, especially for 1921-22; second, from the economic
boom(negative values ofthe cyclical variable, YVAR) for mostof1923-380 Robert J. Barro
'liable 6.3 Regression Results Using Output Relative to Trend
Equation for DB,
Set Sample :£ Constant 1T'e GVAR YVAR d-IDW
(19) 1920-40, 277.1 .004 .08 1.35 .029
1948-82 (.008) (.10) (.13) 1.7
(20) 1920-40, 281.4 - .011 1.56 .13 1.41 .025
1948-82 (.011) (.22) (.09) (.13) 2.1
For DB, 278.0 -.005 .12 1.51 .029
(21) 1920-40 (.024) (.25) (.28) 1.8
1948-82 .003 -.02 1.17
(.008) (.13) (.23)
For DB, 282.1 -.007 1.85 .14 1.41 .025
(22) I: 1920-40 (.026) (.74) (.23) (.28) 2.1
II: 1948-82 -.013 1.58 .12 1.22
(.012) (.26) (.13) (.23)
For DB, 278.5 -.002 1 .20 1.44 .028
(23) I: 1920-40, (.014) (.13) (.17) 1.8
1948-53 .002 -.06 1.21
II: 1954-82 (.009) (.15) (.23)
For DB, 282.4 .003 1.80 .18 1.44 .025
(24) I: 1920-40, (.020) (.86) (.13) (.16) 2.1
1948-53 -.023 1.69 .04 1.21
II: 1954-82 (.016) (.32) (.14) (.24)
Note: See notes to table 6.1.
29; and third, from relatively low values of the GVAR variable. From
1931 to 1940 the values ofdebtgrowth are all positive (i.e., "deficits'').
This behavior reflects the countercyclical response of deficits to the
Great Depression (thatis, to the positive values ofthe cyclical variable,
YVAR, particularly for 1931-35). There are large increases in real fed-
eral spending during the New Deal period after 1932, but not in the
wartime spending that is the basis for my measure oftemporary spend-
ing, GVAR. Therefore, higher federal spending is not a major element
in my estimates ofdebt growth during the 1930s. (The variable GVAR
equals (g - g*)jb, which is negative but declining in magnitude during
the 1930s because ofthe substantial rise in the real debt, 5.) However,
the higher real spending on nondefense items-which I implicitly treat
as permanent-would account for the large increases in tax rates that
occurred under Hoover and Roosevelt from 1932 to 1936. (See Barro381 The Behavior of Uoited States Deficits
18ble 6.3 (continued)
Equation for "IT1 (I. Sample up to 1953 II. Sample up to 1954-82)
Constant "ITt-l "ITt-2 fJ.t-l fJ./-2 RCt- 1 &IDW
.040 -.10 .26 -.02 -.37 -1.42 .017
(.009) (.Il) (.10) (.09) (.08) (.20) 1.3
-.005 .81 .23 .78 .23 -.62
(.005) (.15) (.1l) (.14) (.17) (.12)
.036 -.10 .21 -.01 -.29 -1.02 .017
(.007) (.08) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.19) 1.3
.002 .65 .28 .64 .24 -.58
(.005) (.14) (.09) (.13) (.15) (.1l)
.039 -.08 .24 -.02 -.36 -1.30 .017
(.010) (.Il) (.10) (.10) (.08) (.23) 1.3
-.006 .80 .25 .72 .22 -.56
(.005) (.15) (.Il) (.15) (.17) (.13)
.032 -.08 .19 -.02 -.25 -.92 .017
(.01l) (.08) (.08) (.06) (.08) (.29) 1.4
.002 .65 .31 .57 .21 -.55
(.006) (.14) (.09) (.14) (.15) (.12)
.041 -.08 .23 -.02 -.36 -1.29 .017
(.01l) (.11) (.10) (.09) (.08) (.2l) 1.3
-.006 .79 .23 .73 .23 -.56
(.005) (.15) (.Il) (.15) (.17) (.13)
.025 -.09 .18 -.01 -.25 -.87 .017
(.016) (.08) (.09) (.05) (.1l) (.35) 1.4
.004 .61 .29 .55 .21 -.51
(.006) (.14) (.09) (.14) (.14) (.12)
and Sahasakul 1983, for further discussion.) In any event, the actual
debt growth, DB, is reasonably in line with the estimated values, DB,
throughout the 1930s.
I have already mentioned that the dramatic increases in public debt
during World War II derive primarily from the high values oftemporary
federal spending, as reflected in the GVAR variable. Infact, the average
growth rate of the nominal debt from the end of 1940 until the end of
1945 is 34% per year. (From the end of 1916 until the end of 1919 it is
over 100% peryear.) However, since my detailed results for the periods
ofthe world wars are atpresentunsatisfactory, I cannot say much more
about these episodes.
For the post-World War II period, note first that neither the actual
northe estimated values ofdebtgrowthare very high during the Korean
War, say, 1950-53. The values of GVAR are high, but those for the
cyclical variable, YVAR, are low. Also, the calculated values of ex-
pected inflation, 1Te , are relatively low at this time. The response of
deficits to recessions shows up, for example, in 1949, 1954, 1958, and382 Robert J. Barro
18ble 6.4 Values of Debt Growth and Inftation
Year DB DB DB - DB 7r *
7r-fr
1920 -.038 -.026 - .012 -.014 -.021 .007
1921 -.039 -.030 -.009 - .117 -.091 -.026
1922 -.036 -.054 .018 -.008 -.062 .054
1923 -.038 -.045 .007 .027 -.010 .038
1924 -.049 -.036 -.014 .002 -.028 .030
1925 .000 -.049 .049 .036 - .018 .054
1926 - .112 -.073 -.039 -.023 -.022 .000
1927 -.064 -.072 .008 -.015 -.038 .023
1928 -.049 -.048 -.001 -.010 -.023 .013
1929 -.059 -.072 .013 .000 -.031 .031
1930 -.007 .009 -.016 -.073 -.030 -.043
1931 .084 .132 -.048 -.106 -.008 -.098
1932 .123 .116 .007 - .103 - .021 -.082
1933 .162 .147 .015 .026 .010 .016
1934 .167 .172 -.005 .030 .040 - .011
1935 .177 .135 .042 .015 .036 -.022
1936 .104 .082 .022 .019 .016 .003
1937 .029 .032 -.002 .009 - .014 .023
1938 .043 .064 -.021 -.019 - .011 -.008
1939 .070 .081 - .011 -.002 .015 - .018
1940 .072 .090 -.018 .012 .030 - .018
1948 -.038 -.018 -.019 .008 -.008 .016
1949 .035 .006 .029 -.030 .002 -.032
1950 -.014 .019 -.033 .082 .015 .067
1951 - .018 .013 - .031 .041 .017 .023
1952 .019 .003 .016 .002 .014 - .012
1953 .019 -.022 .041 .007 .001 .006
1954 .013 .027 -.014 -.012 .018 - .031
1955 .000 -.019 .018 .000 -.001 .001
1956 -.029 -.010 -.019 .033 .013 .020
1957 - .011 .001 -.012 .034 .025 .010
1958 .033 .038 -.005 .013 .019 -.006
1959 .035 .001 .034 .011 .008 .004
1960 -.014 .011 -.025 .016 .018 -.002
1961 .022 .022 .000 .007 .005 .002
1962 .018 .002 .016 .014 .009 .005
1963 .006 .014 -.009 .015 .018 -.003
1964 .008 .004 .004 .010 .020 - .011
1965 -.009 -.005 -.004 .020 .023 -.003
1966 -.005 - .011 .005 .030 .031 -.001
1967 .018 .007 .012 .035 .035 .000
1968 .030 .000 .030 .040 .037 .004
1969 -.025 .012 -.037 .053 .058 -.005
1970 .036 .036 .000 .044 .052 - .019
1971 .076 .048 .028 .033 .043 -.010
1972 .057 .049 .008 .036 .055 -.020
1973 -.003 .016 -.020 .095 .059 .036383 The Behavior of United States Deficits
liable 6.4 (continued)
Year DB DB DB - DB 1T 71' 1T-7r
1974 .039 .080 -.041 .112 .094 .018
1975 .255 .206 .050 .065 .093 -.028
1976 .159 .133 .027 .052 .062 - .011
1977 .114 .110 .003 .060 .064 -.004
1978 .092 .087 .005 .082 .076 .006
1979 .072 .089 -.016 .113 .084 .029
1980 .131 .154 -.022 .103 .097 .006
1981 .119 .137 -.018 .077 .065 .012
1982 .201 .189 .012 .041 .058 -.018
Note: DBt == log (B/Bt- 1), whereBtis the value from the endofDecemberofthe privately
held part ofthe interest-bearing public debt-that is, the gross public debt less holdings
byfederal agencies and trust funds and the Federal Reserve. (See Barro 1979 for details.)
DB t is the estimated value from set 1 of table 6.1.
1Tt == log (Pt+1IPt), where Pt is the January value of the seasonally adjusted CPI (less
shelter since 1947).7rt is the estimated value from set 1 of table 6.1.
1961. The Kennedy-Johnson tax cuts for 1964-65 do not correspond
to notable residuals in the equation for debt growth.
For the Vietnam War-say 1966-68-the positive residuals for debt
growth support the common view that taxes were raised insufficiently
at this time. But perhaps because ofthe surcharge on the income tax,
a substantial negative residual does show up for 1969.
Since 1969 expected inflation has become an important influence on
the deficit, as measured bythegrowthin the nominal debt. In particular,
the values of 71'e (which have a one-to-one effect on the estimates of
debt growth, DB) are between 4% and 6% for 1969-73, increase to 9%
for 1974-75, fall to between 6% and 8% for 1976-79, reach 10% in
1980, and then decline to 6% for 1981-82.
The debt equation underpredicts the deficits during the recession
years 1975-76. (However, the error is much greater ifthe YVAR vari-
able is based on real GNP relative to trend rather than the unemploy-
ment rate.) But the debt equation is basically on track for the 1980-
82 recession. For 1982 the actual growth rate of the nominal debt is
20% (corresponding to an increase by $155 billion in the nominal, pri-
vately held, interest-bearing debt), while the estimated value is 19%.
This estimate breaks down into six percentage points owing to antic-
ipated inflation (7i'7 = 6%, although 7i't = 4%) and thirteen percentage
points owing to the recession (YVARt = .034, based on the unemploy-
ment rate of9.5%). Because nothing special is going on with the con-
structed measure of temporary federal spending, GVAR, it turns out
that the constant and the contribution from the GVAR variable essen-
tially cancel out.384 Robert J. Harro
Table 6.5 Values of Explanatory Variables
Year GVAR YVAR g*/b
1917 1.203 -.004 1.12
1918 1.067 -.036 .89
1919 .284 -.014 .37
1920 -.072 .001 .31
1921 .015 .012 .16
1922 -.067 .004 .20
1923 -.071 -.006 .24
1924 -.070 .000 .22
1925 -.083 -.005 .25
1926 -.088 -.009 .28
1927 -.089 -.005 .29
1928 -.096 -.002 .32
1929 - .101 -.006 .34
1930 -.092 .014 .31
1931 -.069 .039 .31
1932 -.048 .036 .17
1933 -.045 .036 .17
1934 -.045 .035 .25
1935 -.037 .026 .22
1936 -.034 .017 .30
1937 -.035 .012 .24
1938 -.029 .019 .22
1939 -.029 .017 .23
1940 .008 .013 .24
1941 .147 .003 .35
1942 .476 -.008 .41
1943 .571 - .010 .27
1944 .494 -.008 .19
1945 .345 -.005 .14
1946 .039 -.002 .15
1947 -.016 -.003 .18
1948 -.022 -.004 .22
1949 -.034 .001 .25
1950 -.012 -.001 .23
1951 .044 -.007 .30
1952 .053 -.009 .36
1953 .029 -.010 .40
1954 .002 .000 .36
1955 -.033 -.005 .39
1956 -.036 -.006 .41
1957 -.038 -.006 .46
1958 -.041 .005 .47
1959 -.052 .000 .48
1960 -.054 .000 .49
1961 -.053 .006 .52
1962 -.053 -.001 .57
1963 -.058 .001 .57
1964 -.062 -.002 .59385 The Behavior of United States Deficits
Table 6.5 (continued)
Year GVAR YVAR g*/b
1965 -.051 -.006 .62
1966 -.007 -.013 .70
1967 .041 -.013 .74
1968 .055 -.016 .78
1969 .038 -.017 .85
1970 -.018 -.005 .91
1971 -.055 .003 .94
1972 -.061 .000 .98
1973 -.087 -.007 1.06
1974 -.087 .000 1.16
1975 -.076 .032 1.10
1976 -.073 .021 .99
1977 -.067 .014 .95
1978 -.063 .005 .96
1979 -.060 .003 .97
1980 -.050 .016 .98
1981 -.049 .020 .94
1982 -.040 .034 .83
Note: GVARt == (gt - g; )/~, where (gt - g;) is temporary real defense spending (based
on Barro 1981b), and ~ == YBt·Bt-1IPt, where Bt is the privately held public debt at the
end of year t (table 6.4) and P t is the GNP deflator for year t.
YVARt == (Vt - .054 . g;/~, where Vt is the unemployment rate in the total labor force
(adjusted as suggested by Darby 1976 for 1933-43)and g; is normal real federal spending,
based on Sahasakul 1983.
I also use the estimated equation to forecast deficits for 1983 and
1984. The inflation equation implies the value 11'7 = 4.8% for 1983. (The
actual value of the inflation rate for 1983 is about 3.5%.) The main
element in the decline of inflationary expectations from 1982 to 1983
is the low actual rate ofinflation, 11't = 4.1%, for 1982. Using the actual
unemployment rate of 9.5% for 1983, the resulting estimate for debt
growth, DBt, for 1983 is 16.6%. Note that 4.8 percentage points ofthis
total come from expected inflation, while 11.8 percentage points derive
from the continuing effect of the recession. (The combined effect of
the constant and the GVAR variable is near zero.) The projected value
for debt growth implies that the level ofdebt would increase from $848
billion at the end of December 1982 to $1,001 billion at the end of
December 1983. Thus the predicted nominal deficit-in the sense of
the change in the privately held, interest-bearing public debt-for cal-
endar 1983 is $153 billion. (To get closer to conventional measures of
the deficit, one should add the increase in high-powered money, which
is roughly $15 billion for calendar 1983.) The data I have at this writing
(kindly supplied to me by Eric Hanushek) indicate that the actual value
of privately held public debt at the end of December 1983 is about386 Robert J. Barro
$1,018 billion. This figure implies an actual growth rate of the debt,
DBt , of 18.3% for 19~3, compared with my projected value of 16.6%.
The gap of0.017 between actual and estimated values is not out ofline
with the fitted equation, for which the standard error of estimate was
0- = 0.023. The actual deficit-inthe sense ofthe change in the nominal,
privately held debt for calendar 1983 is about $170 billion, compared
with my forecast of $153 billion.
For 1984 the value of 1T; turns out to be 6.6%. The main reason for
the rise from 1983 (where 1T; = 4.8%) is the increase in the annual
average rate of monetary growth from 6.3% in 1982 to 10.3% in 1983.
Assuming an unemployment rate of 7.8% for 1984 (see, for example,
Litterman 1984), the projected value of debt growth, DBt, for 1984
turns out to be 13.3%. This forecast breaks up into 6.6 percentage
points from expected inflation and 6.7 percentage points from the cy-
clical variable, YVARt• Theforecast implies that the level ofdebt would
rise from about $1,018 billion at the end of 1983 to $1,163 billion at the
end of1984, orby $145 billion during calendar 1984. (Again, one should
add about $15 billion for the creation of high-powered money to get
closer to the standard concept of the nominal deficit.) This forecast
seems to be roughly in line with other near-term projections ofdeficits.
It also turns out that my forecasts for 1983-84 are basically similar if
I use either the equation where the YVAR variable is based on output
relative to trend (table 6.3, set 19) or the one based on the prime-age
male unemployment rate (table 6.2, set 11).
The main point is that the actual behavior of public debt through
1983-as well as popular forecasts for 1984--is reasonably well in line
with the experience of debt issue since at least the end of World War
I. The main things that are out of line with the previous structure are
projections oflonger-term deficits on the order of $300 billion, condi-
tioned on relatively low values ofthe unemployment rate and expected
inflation. Since there is nothing yet in the data to suggest this type of
structural break, I view these forecasts of deficits as amounting to
predictions that either taxes will be increased or spending will be de-
creased. Standard projections of deficits should not be regarded as
forecasts, once the endogeneity of taxes and spending is taken into
account.
For recent years, where the effects of the constant term and the
GVAR variable turn out to cancel, the forecasts of debt growth-and
hence deficits--emerge from a remarkably simple equation. Namely,
DBt = 'IT; + 3.9 . YVARt = 1T; + 3.9 . (Ut - .054) . g;lbt.
The values for g;lbt until 1982 appear in table 6.5, while the values for387 The Behavior of United States Deficits.
1983 and 1984 are 0.75 and (roughly) 0.71, respectively. Using the value
0.71 in the expression above, the forecasting equation becomes
(16) '" DBt = - .15 + 1T7 + 2.8 . Ute
Equation (16) provides a close approximation to the previously men-
tioned forecasts ofdebt growth for 1983-84. The equation would also
apply satisfactorily to projections further out, subject to the absence
of major changes in the ratio of normal federal spending to the debt,
g;/[jt. (Recall that this ratio rose by a factor offive from 1933 to 1982.)17
Notably, equation (16) implies that the planned growth rate ofthe real
debt, DB t - 1T1, would approach zero if the unemployment rate were
to decline to about 5.5%. It implies further that the projected growth
rate ofthe nominal debt, DBt-whichdetermines the conventional nom-
inal deficit (aside from changes in high-powered money)-would ap-
proach zero if, in addition, the expected rate of inflation were to ap-
proach zero. The point is that there is nothing in the experience of
actual deficits through 1983 that conflicts in any major way with these
propositions.
Comment Martin J. Bailey
I will concentrate my remarks mainly on the descriptive aspects ofthe
paper, after a few words on the theory. 13arro's first maintained hy-
pothesis posits a long-range rational plan that produces tax smoothing.
Contrary to initial appearances, his second is that nonwar government
expenditures represent a random walk, exogenous to the government
decision process. I am surprised that Barro takes these hypotheses
seriously, either on their a priori merits or after seeing the results his
data provide. On the merits, I see no basis for believing that it is even
a fair approximation to say that Congress operates on a long-range
rational plan, no basisfor thinking that the congressional appropriations
process is a mindless random walk, and especially no basis for claiming
both simultaneously. Besides John Shoven's point on the history of
17. Ifone plugs in the 1933 unemployment rate of 27% into equation (16), then (with
1Tf = 6%) the projected growth rate ofdebt is a remarkable 67%. The actual growth rate
of debt for 1933 was only 16%, which I attribute primarily to the smaller size of the
federal government, as measured by the ratio g;lbt• My assessment is that if the United
States encounters a much more serious recession than that in 1982, then (with no change
in structure) we will observe numbers for deficits that dwarfthose experienced recently.
The main element that generates high real deficits is the interaction between recession
(high unemployment) and big government.
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marginal tax rates, we have direct evidence on tax smoothing through
long-range planning in the history of the social security program. On
this, as Barro delicately put it, "I have not yet isolated empirically this
type of effect ... for social security." Indeed not. Tax smoothing for
social security purely and simply means full actuarial funding of the
expected program of benefits. Further, the data for World War II fit
neither the regressions based on other years nor the maintained hy-
pothesis. So much for the theoretical framework.
The empirical results viewed as pure description, however, merit
attention. The equations for expected inflation are reasonable versions
ofthe Feige/Pierce conceptofeconomically rational expectations: they
use a small, reasonably efficient set oflagged variables. Their change
in coefficients after the period break at the end of 1953 roughly confirm
Gordon's (1980) findings on Phillips curves and the Sargent (1973) ar-
gumentonthe dependence ofthe appropriate lag structureonthe policy
regime. However, the best time for a period break was about 1970.
Before that, inflation decayed rapidly or reversed itself; afterward, it
persisted.
The deficit regressions provide a provocative characterization ofthe
way our political system has on the average worked out. The main
findings are the following, as I interpret them.
1. The portion ofnominal federal interest costs that compensate for
expected inflation is either partly, wholly, ormore than wholly financed
by new debt, depending on which regression you prefer. The regres-
sions I prefer include an interest rate variable; they show the compen-
sation for inflation to be about two-thirds financed by nominal bond
issues and one-third financed by tax and seigniorage (money printing)
revenues.
2. The budgeted costs of small wars were about two-thirds financed
by taxes and seigniorage, and the remaining third by net new bond
issues. The difference between this allocation and the preceding one
for expected inflation does not appear to be statistically significant.
3. Debt issues increase in recessions as revenues net oftransfers fall
more than proportionately to income and decrease in recovery and
boom periods. That's reassuring; any regression with such an impli-
cation can't be all bad.
4. The question whether recent deficits are out of line with past
experience is notansweredconclusively. Inthe regressions that contain
an interest-rate variable, the question was not tested (as it could have
been by including a dummy for the pertinent period, say that after
1971). However, there are indications of a shift, contrary to Barro's
claim. Equation (6), which breaks the periods at the end of 1953, has
a higher constant term for the post-1953 period than that for the pre-
1954 period; the difference exceeds its standard error but is short of389 The Behavior of United States Deficits
significance. The poorer fitting but parallel equation (24), which uses
output instead ofemployment as the output variable, has a coefficient
for expected inflation significantly greater than one. Inasmuch as both
inflation and real deficits had uptrends, this otherwise surprising coef-
ficient probably is a proxy for an uptrend of deficits since 1953. The
question is still open.
5. In the regressions that included World War II, the coefficient for
wartime expenditures, no doubt driven by the extreme points given by
that war, shows the war to have been financed three-fourths by debt
held by the private sector. Even apart froro the poor fit ofthese regres-
sions, the World War II experience cannot possibly help the tax-
smoothing hypothesis, because the government allowed the allocation
offinancing between debt financing and nl0ney printing to be decided
by the private sector. Acceding to the Treasury preference ofthe day,
the Federal Reserve System stood ready to buy all treasury bonds
offered at prices low enough to yield 2.5fJo nominal interest; it pegged
the treasury bill yield even lower. (It is arnazing to me that households
and firms were willing to hold such huge amounts ofgovernment debt
on such unattractive terms.)
In summary, if we dismiss Barro's maintained hypotheses, we can
nevertheless read his results with some instruction and profit. I think
we could learn even more from a study that tried alternative, more
plausible specifications and that tested the popular hypothesis of in-
creasing budget indiscipline more directly.. I would want the test to be
imbedded in a regression that allows the data to determine how nonwar
spending changes are financed. Besides that one, other systematic ten-
dencies of fiscal behavior are worth investigating and describing. For
most issues, I would want to see a different breakdown ofperiods. For
all that, Barro's work is a useful, and in some ways original and sur-
prising, contribution.
Comment John B. Shoven
This is an interesting and thought-provoking paper, along the same
lines as Barro's 1979 Journal ofPolitical Economy article. Frankly,
though, it is not clear at all that it is successful. It presents Barro's
earlier tax-smoothing model of deficits. ~rhe argument is that under
certain restrictive assumptions regarding separability ofutility between
goods and leisure and the like, it can be shown that a constant marginal
tax rate on commodities is Pareto optimal. Under these conditions, the
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tax rate should be constant both across commodities and through time.
The time constancyprevents peoplefrom inefficiently allocatingmarket
activity toward those periods with temporarily low tax rates. The con-
clusion of this model is that tax rates should not follow the uneven
pattern of government expenditures, and that deficits are the vehicle
that allows the government to separate the timing ofexpenditures and
taxes.
Taken literally, the theory provides strong predictions about the size
ofthe government deficit as a function of the deviations ofaggregate
output and government expenditure from their "normal" path. The
theory, ofcourse, is not very·plausible. How is it that policymakers in
Washington figured out the Ramsey optimal tax rule fifty years before
public finance economists? Does anyone really believe that the pro-
jected 1984-88 deficits are what they are owing to tax smoothing?
The theory, though, is clearin its predictions. However, the empirical
results ofthe paper do not lend support to the theory. The paper finds
that the deficit generating process has been more or less stable, but
that it has not followed a pattern consistent with tax-smoothing prin-
ciples. First, Barro ran twenty-four sets ofaggregate time series regres-
sions in tables 6.1 through 6.3, and in none ofthem did the temporary
government spending variable have a coefficient approximating unity,
which the theory predicts. In fact, the results of table 6.3, which use
output relative to trend for the economic activity variable, show the
coefficient oftemporarygovernment spending as being not significantly
different from zero. Second, and more disturbing, in almost all of his
regressions Barro has had to throw out the World War II years. This
is particularly destructive to the theory, since these years provide, in
some sense, "the real test" ofthe theory, especially when one notices
that battle casualties are the primary proxy for temporary government
expenditures. When Barro does include the World War II years, the fit
of his regressions seriously deteriorates and produces very large re-
siduals for the World War II years.
Another approach to investigating the tax-smoothing theory would
be to look at the tax rates themselves. The broadest measure ofaverage
tax rates is the ratio oftotal federal tax collections to GNP. This ratio
has been relatively stable, at least in the post-World War II period.
However, constant average tax rates do not imply fixed average mar-
ginal tax rates. Barro and Sahasakul (1983) have calculated average
marginal tax rates for the federal personal income tax. The rates they
find certainly are not constant. I have not done any statistical analysis
of the series, and it is hard to recognize a random walker when you
see one, but this series certainly looks as though it is headed toward
higher average marginal tax rates. Even ifthe average marginal tax rate
were constant, we know the composition oftax rates has changed. For391 The Behavior of United States Deficits
instance, the highest rate has fallen from roughly 90% to 50%. Further,
we know that the marginal income tax rate changes in predictable ways
for individuals facing a typical age/earnings orexperience/earnings pro-
file. Certainly medical students do not believe their marginal tax rates
are going to follow a random walk; they know that their tax rate is
going to rise, and they can and will retime economic activity on this
account. The point is that the optimal tax literature Barro invokes calls
notfor constantaverage marginal tax rates, butratherfor a flat marginal
tax rate.
What have we learned after Barro's analysis? Well, not much that
we did not know before. First, average tax rates tend to rise in wars;
on the other hand, wars are partially financed with debt. Some would
argue that this spreads the burden ofthe war onto future generations,
but that is not an argument I want to get into here. Second, deficits
are countercyclical-even more so than a constant average tax rate
suggests. This either means that we have a progressive tax system
(which we clearly do, since the elasticity of tax receipts to nominal
income is about 1.5) or that an active countercyclical tax policy was
pursued-probably a little of both. The final conclusion of the paper
that I will mention, and perhaps the one I find most interesting, is that
the current deficits, even those projected for 1984, are not far off the
usual pattern. The assertion is that if"normal" unemployment is taken
as 5.4% (which is lower than the consensus today for NAIRU [non-
accelerating rate ofunemployment]) and if 1984 unemployment comes
in at 7.8% (which is higher than the consensus), and ifinflation is 6.6%
(again, higher than the consensus), then Barro's operation predicts a
$145 billion deficit for 1984, lower than other projections, but in the
ballpark. It is clear that the historical deficit generating process can
almost account for the current deficit, but it requires several assump-
tions, each shadedrelative to consensus in a direction that will generate
higher deficit forecasts.
Let me conclude by saying that I think Barro is conducting an in-
teresting and important line of research despite the fact that the data
did not come through in this paper in support of the posited theory.
More work is required for us to gain a better picture of the deficit
generating process.
Discussion Summary
Alan Auerbach pointed out that the Ramsey tax-smoothing model pre-
dicts that there should be no capital taxes but simply levies on labor392 Robert J. Harro
or consumption. The existence of capital taxes in the United States
system, andthe progressivity ofincome taxes, was, he felt, inconsistent
with the thrust ofthe paper. Robert Hall noted that upward drift oftax
rates was not at all inconsistent with the Ramsey model in a world with
real growth-the optimal tax rate would rise. A problem that both he
and Lawrence Summers saw with the paper was the "positive versus
normative" issue; he suggested that World War II exemplified bad
policy in that it was financed by increases in marginal tax rates, and
this fact made him doubt the relevance of the analysis. Christopher
Sims received some comfort from the accuracy ofthe predictions but
felt that the use offuturevalues ofanticipatedinflation could rationalize
any deficit projection. Stanley Fischer also believed that the "unreal-
istic" inflation projections used for 1983 and 1984 adversely affected
the interpretation ofthe results.
Both Fischer and Herschel Grossman felt that the temporary nature
of wars was overdone, since many of the costs of wars are paid long
after they have ended on the battlefield, and Grossman gave as an
example the permanent change in the defense posture of the United
States following Pearl Harbor. Summers also noted that wartime ex-
penditures were mismeasured in conventional accounts, since they
ignore the "draft tax" imposed on the economy.
Grossman suggested that the analysis should have been conducted
for the consolidated federal and state and local government sectors,
and he suspected that there was substantial crowding out of state and
local spendingbyfederal expenditures, especiallyin wartime. Summers
suggested that modeling government expenditures as a random walk
was misleading, since random walks not only rise but also fall-unlike
government spending; he felt a model with irreversibility was neces-
sary. He also noted that economists' advice was endogenous, hence
when deficits rise, economists provide pressure for these deficits to be
reduced.
Alan Blinder noted that a major reason the model was incapable of
explaining the events ofthe World War II was that it generated exces-
sively high inflation expectations. To test the substantive part of the
model, he believed that an alternative expectational assumption such
as perfect foresight should have been attempted. Second, he suggested
that aggregating money and taxes was inadequate; he felt that money,
taxes, and bonds deserved separate treatment. Robert Gordon sug-
gested that an incorrect place had been selected for the regime breaks.
He felt that a more natural break occurred in the 1960s when the
decision was made to finance the Vietnam War with money, not bonds.
Rudiger Dornbusch questioned making expenditures independent of
tax rates, since he felt the two were interdependent. He also believed
that including unanticipated tax collections in the empirical analysis393 The Behavior of Uoited States Deficits
was inadvisable, since the model purported to account for the planning
behavior ofthe government. Finally, he observed that the real interest
rate used in the paper should be posttax, and that this might influence
the results.
Inresponse to the concerns about the appropriateness ofthe inflation
predictions used, Robert Barro pointed out that the predictions were
implicit in the estimated model, not picked from an outside source. He
also noted that the ratio ofgovernment purchases to GNP did both rise
and fall, so modeling it as a random walk \\las not obviously at variance
with the facts. He also defended the aggregation of money and taxes
by drawing attention to the similarity of the inflation taxes and other
taxes.
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